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# **Defending an independent Catalonia**

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## **PREFACE**

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Since retirement from the Irish Defence Forces in Sept 2003, I have been an occasional contributor to the Irish Times, and the Glasgow Herald, on Irish and Scottish defence issues. I also wrote a Paper "Reflections on the Defence of an Independent Scotland" which was published by the Dublin based IIEA in July 2013. On 18 September 2014, when the Scots voted to remain in the UK, I closed my file on Scottish Defence, and opened another one on Catalan Defence. This paper is meant to be an objective, if academic, exercise. It does not take a political position, either way, on the actual case for independence being made by Catalan nationalists.

I soon discovered that the Catalan nationalists had no defence policy. Unlike the Scots, who had a framework for a viable defence policy in their independence manifesto, Scotland's Future (Scottish Government, November 2013), the Catalan nationalists had no clear position on defence, and were mostly distrustful of all things military.

The one exception was SEM, the Barcelona-based Society for Military Studies, who were struggling to develop a policy with limited resources. The big gap in their work was the lack of military expertise. I decided to try to fill that gap, and, in mid-2016, I concluded a Paper presenting my assessment of the issues involved in a Catalan defence policy.

With the support of SEM, my Paper was subsequently incorporated as a chapter of a book, in Catalan, entitled "Política de Defensa i Estat Propi" (A Defence Policy for our own State). This book was finally published, in Catalan, in February 2017, by Editorial Base in Barcelona. The objective of the book is to influence Catalan public opinion on the need for an Independent Catalonia to have a defence policy.

This Paper is an updated and revised version of my chapter in the book. It is narrowly focussed on defence issues, and does not explore foreign policy options, accepting that most parties in the Catalan Regional Government have an inclusive approach to foreign relations. Hence the working assumptions on membership of international organisations. The overall scenario selected, that independence will be achieved in agreement with Spain, is intentional. This Paper does not speculate on other, less benign, scenarios, such as armed resistance to Spanish rule, use of armed force by Madrid to control Catalonia or post-independence conflict between Catalan nationalists and Catalan unionists.

Costings are also excluded, as there are too many variables at play to make a meaningful assessment.

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Navan, Irlanda



## **I. INTRODUCTION**

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The purpose of this article is to present an analysis of the issues affecting the development of a defence policy for an Independent Catalonia.

It is based, in part, on similar studies conducted on Irish and Scottish Defence.

The context envisaged is where Catalan independence has been achieved peacefully, in agreement with Spain.

## **II. SCOPE OF PAPER**

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This paper is presented under the following headings:

- assumptions on Catalonia's external relations that affect its defence policy,
- the deterrent principle,
- threat analysis,
- historical and geographic considerations,
- roles and tasks of the Catalan Defence Forces (CDF),
- resources and capabilities required,
- negotiations with Spain on defence issues,
- conclusion

## **III. ASSUMPTIONS ON EXTERNAL RELATIONS**

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On the understanding that a future Catalonia will pursue an inclusive, rather than an isolationist, foreign policy, the following assumptions are made:

- Catalonia joins the UN and plays an active role in UN peace support operations (1)
- Catalonia will join the EU and support the "Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), which might lead to a Common Defence", (2)
- Catalonia will join NATO and commit to the principle of mutual defence, (3)
- Catalonia will join the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE),
- Catalonia will be open to defence cooperation with other states, including Spain.

## **IV. THE DETERRENT PRINCIPLE**

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In this day and age, it is impossible for any nation to ensure total defence. For this reason, almost all national defence policies are based, one way or the other, on the deterrent principle. The deterrent principle is based on a nation having sufficient military capabilities to make it too costly for an enemy to attack. The aim is, as far as possible, to prevent armed aggression against the State.



In terms of military capabilities, Catalonia will need to be able to deter armed aggression on land, at sea and in the air. Therefore, it has to have three dimensional conventional armed forces, that is; an army, a navy and an air force. Only such forces can provide a credible national defence, and also fulfil Catalonia's international commitments as a member of the UN, the EU, NATO and OSCE. Since its purpose is defensive, and not offensive, the forces may be designated as the Catalan Defence Forces (CDF).

The size, organisation and equipment, of the CDF will be primarily influenced by an assessment of the threats to Catalonia and to its national interests, by its international commitments, and by budgetary considerations.

## **V. HISTORICAL AND GEOGRAPHIC CONSIDERATIONS**

Catalonia has to take a long range and strategic view of its national security. It must create a security and defence structure that is flexible, effective, and adaptable to changing circumstances.

A historical perspective is an essential component in considering its national security and defence requirements. Since Catalonia is an integral part of Europe, the historical perspective must not be limited to Catalan history, but take into account events in Europe, with particular attention to the past one hundred and fifty years (4). A good appreciation of the past is necessary to have a good geopolitical understanding of the present.

Likewise, planners have to consider future developments that may have a bearing on Catalonia's national defence. While politicians usually face the electorate every five years, Government white papers on defence often cover a ten-year period. Military equipment programmes, however, have to consider a much longer time span, perhaps up to 50 years in some cases, starting with research and development, lead-in time for production, operational life and decommissioning (5). Effective decision making requires taking into account future trends, in so far as they can be envisaged.

In geographical terms, the dominant consideration has to be Catalonia's location on the Mediterranean. In this regard, Catalonia's strategic area of interest, will, similar to France and Spain, include all countries in the western half of the Mediterranean Sea.

## **VI. THREAT ASSESSMENT**

### **General**

While certain countries have specific issues that affect them, in general, threats to Catalonia are largely the same as the threats facing other European nations. As, in reality, most threats are in common, it makes sense to join in common action to deal with these threats.

Therefore, in developing a threat assessment, Catalonia does not have to "re-invent the wheel". The threat/risk assessments of other European nations are continually



being evolved and updated. A good, and recent, example, would be the German White Paper on Defence, published in July 2016 (6).

There is now a broad consensus on what currently constitute the main threats to European nations. These are variously listed. My list is as follows, in order of immediacy:

- International terrorism
- Cyber warfare
- Inter-state and intra-state conflicts
- Threats to communications, supply lines, trade routes
- Threats from Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) (7)
- Uncontrolled migration
- Environment disasters and climate change
- Epidemics and pandemics
- Internal security
- Invasion

Let us to look at each threat more closely and relate them to any future defence policy.

### **Threat number 1: International Terrorism**

Catalonia is vulnerable to terrorist attack, as it has freedom of movement to its centres of population, a significant non-Catalan population that can hide terrorist cells, and abundant soft targets. A few bomb and gun attacks placed along the Costas could damage the tourism industry overnight, as it has done already in Tunisia and Egypt.

The question, could it happen, is easy to answer. The question, would it happen, is more problematical. At present, Catalonia is not 'on the terrorist radar' as a separate political entity. After independence, as Catalonia gets more involved with international organisations countering terrorism, and as it becomes more difficult to conduct terrorist attacks against the larger nations, this could change.

With independence comes the responsibility to stand with allies. Should the present wave of terrorist attacks escalate, it can be envisaged that passive measures of just raising security measures at home, will not be enough. It may well be necessary for Catalonia to participate in international counter terrorism operations abroad. For example, this could involve the Catalan Army training indigenous forces to counter terrorism (Irish Army, as part of an EU force, in Mali) or the Catalan Air Force conducting air strikes against terrorist targets (Danish Air Force in Iraq). It could also include the sharing of intelligence.

Combatting terrorism involves more than the security forces of the State. It involves all of society. Media amplification and sensationalisation of terrorist attacks support the terrorist cause. Countering terrorism may ultimately require restrictions on civil liberties and focussed media guidelines. Of particular concern to the security services will be, how best to organise the collection, evaluation and dissemination of intelligence.

A Catalan Defence Policy needs to include how Catalonia can best be protected from terrorist attacks and the associated resources required.



## **Threat number 2: Cyber Attacks**

As an advanced society, Catalonia is heavily dependent on communications and information technology (IT), and therefore vulnerable to cyber-attack. Every single aspect of life requires IT, directly or indirectly. Cyber- attacks can bring industry to a standstill, cause chaos in transportation systems, paralyse financial institutions, and disrupt food distribution systems.

The main challenge with cyber-attacks is their anonymity. On the conventional battlefield, the first requirement is to locate and identify the enemy's dispositions, before counter-fire can be directed. In the case of cyber warfare, you also have to find out who the enemy is, and not just where he is 'firing' from. At the present stage of IT development, the attacker has the advantage over the defender. Cyber warfare will remain a serious threat until such time as technology develops to eliminate that advantage.

Catalan defence planners should study carefully the cyber-attack on Estonia in 2007 (8), the Estonian response and NATO's reaction. A key question is; could a cyber-attack ever be an acceptable reason to invoke NATO's Article 5 (mutual defence clause)?

## **Threat number 3: Inter-state and Intra-state conflicts**

As a member of the EU, NATO and the OSCE, Catalonia will be expected to play its part in conflict prevention and conflict resolution in, and close to, the EU.

At present, conflict within the borders of the EU is considered very remote. Nevertheless, recent statements from Russian leaders, and their aides, have raised concerns in the Baltic states. Moreover, conflict in the zone of interest of the EU, can also lead to economic disruption and instability within the union. For the purposes of this Paper the zone of interest of the EU is considered to extend out 4,000km from its borders. (9)

The main areas of current concern are Syria, Iraq, Ukraine, Libya, Yemen, Mali, South Sudan, Somalia and Chad. Member states of the EU have had to intervene already where the lives of EU citizens are at risk, or energy supply routes threatened. Such conflicts often involve proxy forces of neighbouring nations taking sides to protect their national or ethnic interests. Unless contained, the conflict can spread. Recent conflicts in particular, are linked to a rise in terrorist attacks and uncontrolled migration.

As a member of the EU, NATO and the OSCE, Catalonia will be expected to make a contribution to European security.

## **Threat number 4: Communications, Supply Lines and Trade Routes**

Catalonia is an advanced sophisticated society, dependent on international trade. Disruptions to its communications, supply lines and trade routes, are a threat to the national economy. Catalonia can be expected to assist in EU anti-piracy operations.



### **Threat number 5: Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs)**

While, at present, there is no likelihood of a nuclear attack against Catalonia, the country may receive fallout from nuclear attacks in a future conflict, or indeed from nuclear accidents abroad. The failure to contain the spread of nuclear technology has led to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and has also increased the possibility of terrorists developing a nuclear capability.

Of greater concern, terrorists may resort to chemical and biological attacks. Chemical weapons have reportedly been used in Syria.

Personnel of the CDF serving on peace support missions in war zones, may be under threat indirectly by the effects of WMDs, including unexploded chemical ordnance.

### **Threat number 6: Uncontrolled Migration**

Migration, as such, should not pose a threat to national security. However, there is evidence that terrorist organisations are using the movement of migrants to infiltrate agents into Europe for the purposes of carrying out terrorist attacks. In this way, failure to control migration poses a security threat that needs to be addressed.

### **Threat number 7: Environmental Disasters and Climate Change**

As the world becomes more populous, humanity is at increasingly greater risk from environmental disasters, some linked to climate change. Catalonia is not currently regarded as especially vulnerable, at this stage, but may, in future generations, be affected by rising seawaters. Nevertheless, there are increasing numbers of extreme weather events which pose new challenges to society. Environmental disasters can also be man-made.

Environmental warfare is still over the horizon, even though the technology to influence weather systems, locally, has already been developed.

While national and local civilian agencies are tasked to deal with such emergencies, when their capacities are exceeded, the CDF may be called upon to save lives and property, and maintain public order.

### **Threat number 8: Epidemics and pandemics**

The risk of epidemics and pandemics posing a threat to national security is always present. So far, most western societies have been able to cope with incidents and, as a threat to national security and defence, it is considered low.

However, some morning we could wake up and find out that a super bug threatens to wipe out all, or part of, humanity. In this case, it could jump to threat number 1 on our list.



### **Threat number 9: Internal Security**

Internal security threats to the stability of a state are always possible, even though western societies usually cope well with them. Generally speaking, state security agencies have better intelligence on internal threats than on external ones.

This paper makes no attempt to elaborate on possible internal security threats to a future independent Catalonia. Let us just list it, and move on.

### **Threat number 10: Invasion**

Having successfully achieved independence in agreement with Spain, the new State will emerge on the world scene with no nation-state enemies. If we are only considering the present, we could readily reject the threat of invasion completely.

In the past 80 years, every single country in, and around, the Mediterranean, has known the horrors of war. Moreover, if we look back at the past 150 years of European History, we see that invasion and occupation was the norm, and for Catalonia, the memory of the 1936/39 conflict will always be there.

In reality, only a handful of European nations have succeeded in remaining at peace over the last 150 years (10). We cannot ignore that anything is possible over the next 150 years, including the dreadful scourge of history repeating itself. For this reason, invasion has to be retained on the threat list, however remote.

## **VII. ROLES OF THE CATALAN DEFENCE FORCES**

As previously outlined, it will be the primary requirement of the State to protect its citizens, defend its sovereignty and preserve its territorial integrity. Each element of Government will have a role to play in this primary mission.

The suggested Roles of the CDF might be:

- to defend Catalonia against armed aggression, (11)
- to participate in international peace support operations,
- to conduct search and rescue operations,
- to assist the national police in maintaining public order,
- to assist the civil authority in the event of emergencies and natural disasters,
- ceremonial and other tasks that may be required by Government.

### **Role number 1: Defending Catalonia Against Armed Aggression**

The CDF will be the lead agency in dealing with some of the threats outlined above. However, in some countries the lead agency, for certain threats, may be the police, or another constituted body, such as a national security authority. Even if not the lead agency, the CDF will be tasked to provide support in many cases. For example,



in many democracies, the Police are the primary agency for internal state security, and the military are called in when the police have not got the resources or expertise to handle a situation.

Whatever is decided by the new state the relationship between the CDF and the national police (Mossos d' Esquadra) needs to be defined.

Based on the deterrent principle, the CDF must have capabilities to fulfil its designated role in countering all ten threats outlined above. There are no guidelines laid down as to what constitutes a military deterrent. During peacetime, Catalonia, like other western democracies, can opt for relatively modest forces. What is important is that the CDF has a capacity to expand if the threat level increases.

### **Role number 2: Participation in International Peace Support Operations** (12)

The deployment of personnel, and units, of the CDF in international peace support missions, will be a powerful symbol of Catalonia taking its place among the nations of the world. The sensitisation of public opinion to make sacrifices for international peace, will be essential. Involvement in peace support operations will come at a price, but it can be a source of national pride.

Risk sharing is necessary. In other words, Catalonia should offer combat units as well as non-combat units to peace support missions.

Participation with units in UN missions has some advantages. The UN partly pays for contingents through making per diem payments in respect of personnel, and through reimbursement for nationally owned equipment. In the case of EU and NATO missions, "costs lie where they fall", which means essentially that the participating nation pays its own costs.

Participation in UN missions enhances the country's profile within the UN, which could support a Member State's efforts to get one of the rotating seats on the UN Security Council.

Before sending a unit abroad, Catalonia should send officers to various schools in Europe which train personnel for such missions. It is also advisable to begin first with sending military observers on missions, to build up a corporate knowledge of peacekeeping expertise. Catalonia should build up its peacekeeping experience and knowledge gradually. This will minimise risk, reduce casualties and avoid unnecessary expense.

As a suggestion, the total number of personnel on peace support missions abroad on a sustained basis, should be limited. It must be remembered that, for sustainability, the total overseas commitment is actually three times greater than the number deployed overseas. While 1/3 are abroad, another 1/3 are at home training and preparing to replace them, and 1/3 will have just returned, requiring post mission leave (4 weeks is normal), and retraining. Based on likely resources available (see para VIII) a ceiling of 1,100 personnel is suggested. Moreover, personnel should not be sent abroad too frequently, as this would be detrimental to their health and family life.



The following are just some of the CDF units, and elements, which could be considered as contingents for overseas duty, although, based on our suggested capping of 1,100 personnel, clearly not all could be abroad at any one time:

(sample list, indicative only)

- mechanised battalion on UN peace support operation
- transport company on UN peace support operation
- warship on EU anti-piracy duty or humanitarian operation
- squadron of fighters on NATO duties
- military observers/monitors with UN, EU and OSCE
- military training cadre with EU mission in Africa
- specialist units such as military police, medics, EOD (explosive ordnance disposal) teams,
- staff officers and NCOs serving on mission HQs.

### **Role number 3: Search and Rescue Operations**

An independent Catalonia will have to address how best to provide land, maritime and air rescue services, for the independent State. Independence provides the opportunity to consider how these services could best be provided, when the Spanish Air force and Navy withdraw.

Consideration could be given to civilianise these services by awarding contracts to private companies, by a mix of contract and state services, or by the CDF taking over full responsibility for all these services.

A comprehensive review is necessary, including an assessment of the efficiency of all those agencies currently providing these services. Such a review could define the role, and indicate the tasks, to be carried out by the CDF.

While local and regional authorities use mainly local resources for mountain rescue and other emergencies, with the firefighting services to the fore, air and maritime emergencies may require resources which are at national level. (see also para IX, Negotiations with Spain).

### **Role number 4: Assistance to the National Police**

As in many democracies, the CDF may be required to assist the police in maintaining public order. This may involve troops being tasked to perform police duties in circumstances where the police are unable to operate effectively.

Because of its wartime role, and overseas missions, the CDF will have to have units trained in bomb disposal, and mine clearance. To avoid duplication, it may be appropriate for Catalonia to have the CDF tasked with dealing with devices in the homeland, rather than the police.

CDF backup to the police could also be envisaged for technical support not normally available to the police.



### **Role number 5: Assistance to the Civil Authorities for Emergencies and Natural Disasters**

The CDF may also be called out by the civil authority to deal with a wide variety of emergencies and natural disasters, beyond the capabilities of local resources. Military assistance may be required to deal with floods, forest fires, earthquakes, plane and rail crashes and other situations where life and property are under threat.

The CDF may also be required to provide emergency services, such as in strike situations, where life and property are at risk.

Military field engineer companies, heavy transport units, medics and helicopters may require to be deployed to aid the civil authority.

### **Role number 6: Ceremonial and other tasks as may be required by Government**

Ceremonial duties are also a significant part of peacetime soldiering, and can consume a surprising number of duty-hours. The dignity and solemnity of state, and even local, occasions, are enhanced by the involvement of the military in ceremonial. Moreover, as a sovereign independent state, Catalonia would be expected to extend normal military courtesies towards foreign dignitaries, on appropriate occasions, such as for State visits, or when new ambassadors present their testimonials to the Head of State. Military ceremonial involves guards of honour, gun salutes, colour parties, escorts of honour, naval salutes, fly-pasts and honours at state funerals. The CDF will probably be too small to have full time ceremonial units. Instead these duties will be undertaken by units in addition to their normal tasks.

The CDF will be a disciplined force available to carry out tasks that may be assigned by the Government. These tasks could include the defence of vital installations, ministerial air transport or assistance in evacuations.

## **VIII. MILITARY RESOURCES AND CAPABILITIES REQUIRED**

It is suggested, as a rough guideline, that Catalonia pegs its annual defence spending at approximately the same level as Spain, that is 1.2% of GDP (13), while agreeing in principle to move eventually towards the NATO target of 2%. This should reassure allies that Catalonia takes its national defence seriously, given that most NATO member nations currently spend between 1% and 1.4% of its GDP on defence.

This is in line with a detailed study on the possible costs of defending an Independent Scotland, made in 2012, which came up with an estimate of between 1.1% and 1.3% of GDP (14).



As it will take several years to recruit, train and equip the CDF, actual annual defence spending may take some time to reach the 1.2% target. A distinction needs to be made between capital and infrastructure expenditure and funding for personnel. A suggested ratio, Pay, to non-Pay, expenditure might be 60:40.

It is also suggested that Catalonia maintains somewhat less (proportionally) than the same number of personnel under arms, as Spain, which is 4.9 per 1000, of total population (15). (France has 3.5 per 1000). This article proposes a staffing level of approx 3.1 per 1000 of total population, which would indicate a force of around 24,000 military personnel, 16,000 regular and 8,000 reserve. There would also be a substantial civilian component working for the Defence Department.

It is recommended also that all forces be volunteers, no conscription. To attract the best men and women, pay and conditions should be attractive, with a high standard of education, 3rd level for commissioned officers and 2nd level for soldiers. Consideration for having representative associations in the forces (similar to Ireland) is recommended(16).

Whatever framework is adopted it must always be remembered that it takes much longer to train officers and NCOs (non-commissioned officers) than soldiers. For this reason, it is better to have a proportionately higher number of officers and NCOs in service during peacetime.

Military capabilities are dealt with under the following headings; - Land, Maritime, Air, Command and Control and Military College.

### **Military Capabilities: Land**

For the purpose of this paper I would recommend that the CA (Catalan Army) be a two brigade army, with a wartime and peacetime establishment (strength).

Each brigade would have the following establishment/strength, total 5,000 (3500 regulars + 1500 reservists):

infantry battalions	3 (mechanised)
tank battalion	1 (medium tanks)
artillery battalion	1 (light field artillery + heavy mortars + SAM (surface to air missiles))
Reconnaissance Company	1
Field Engineer Company	1
CIS (communications IT) company	1
military police Company	1
logistics battalion	1 (transport company, medical company, ordnance company, supply company, maintenance engineer platoon)
Brigade HQ	1

In addition to the two brigades, the following regular units will be at Army level:

Special forces company  
Cyber warfare company  
Defence Forces HQ CIS Company



Assorted combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units. The latter would have garrison cadres to administer and guard all installations of the CDF. There will also be a need for a Defence Forces Training Centre, training areas, and a Logs Base.

All these would require approximately 2,500 regular troops.

An additional 3,500 reservists would augment the Army in wartime, mainly to protect vital installations.

Total land forces: 16,000 (9,500 regular troops and 6,500 reservists).

### **Military Capabilities: Maritime**

The main role of the Catalan Navy (CN) is to defend Catalonia's territorial waters, which could involve a wide variety of operations from coastal patrolling up to limited naval combat. Other likely tasks include; - anti-piracy patrols, convoy escorts (with other navies), drug interdiction, fishery protection, humanitarian rescue, maritime environmental protection, mine hunting, support for diplomacy and foreign trade, and possibly maritime survey.

The (CN) should have two frigates which would be inter-operable with NATO navies and capable of a naval combat role. The rest of the fleet should include, possibly, four mine hunters, four to six coastal patrol ships and support vessels.

While the CN's main area of operations, and area of interest, are in the relatively calmer seas of the Mediterranean, many of its warships need to be ocean-going to participate in international operations. Moreover, in the construction, or acquisition, of CN warships, defence planners must keep in mind the expected surge in extreme weather conditions, arising out of climate change, over the coming decades.

Without going into detail, an indicative fleet of between 14 to 16 warships is suggested, and an overall strength of approx 2,500 regular personnel, and 1000 naval reservists.

### **Military Capabilities: Air**

The main role for the Catalan Air Force (CAF) is to defend national airspace over Catalonia and over its territorial waters. In peacetime, this may involve intercepting unauthorised foreign military aircraft, or any aircraft that poses a threat. In wartime, this may involve a wide variety of air defence tasks, plus tactical air support for ground troops.

The current immediate reaction requirement is to have two fighter jets, on standby at all times to react. Until Catalonia has this capability it will need to enter an agreement either with NATO, or bilaterally with another State (Spain or France?). Defence planners should look at the recently concluded agreement between Belgium and the Netherlands to alternate this air cover, with two fighters on standby to cover both countries, at any one time (17).

As a member of NATO, Catalonia could also be involved in air patrolling of NATO borders, such as presently being conducted by the Belgian Air Force in Lithuania.



The CAF may also be required to carry out any of the following additional tasks, such as; - air transportation, logistics support, maritime surveillance, helicopter medevac. The CAF may also be tasked to airlift special forces or support humanitarian operations.

Consequently, the inventory of the CAF needs to include a fighter wing (30 F-16 or similar) a helicopter wing, an air transport wing, maritime surveillance aircraft and training aircraft. Possibly up to 70 aircraft in all.

An indicative strength of regular CAF personnel would be 2,000 regular personnel plus 500 air force reservists.

### **Command and Control**

The CDF will need to have a General Staff and a Joint Defence Forces HQ. (estimated 600 regular personnel). The Catalan Chief of Defence Forces Staff (CHOD) should report directly to the Minister for Defence. He may be assisted by two Deputy Chiefs of Staff, one for Operations and one for Support.

### **Military College**

There will be a need for a Catalan Military College (estimated 400 regular personnel). Officer Cadet training will be initially conducted there for all three services, with successful candidates continuing their training at Army, Navy and Air schools, as appropriate. Specialist training such as cyber warfare defence, which are in common to all three services, may also be conducted at the Military College.

A Command and Staff School, to train future senior officers, will also be part of the Military College system, for all three services. While a higher-level course (National Defence College) for senior officers, civil servants and diplomats, could be envisaged, this should not be attempted until the military education system is fully functional, and experienced staff are available.

## **IX. NEGOTIATIONS WITH SPAIN ON DEFENCE ISSUES**

Defence issues will play a major role in the independence negotiations with Spain.

Catalan taxpayers have contributed approximately 20% of the funding for the Spanish Armed Forces, and have a feasible claim to 20% of all military assets currently in the Spanish military inventory. It is also possible, in principle, that Spain might want to downsize its inventory to reflect the reduced requirements for military assets as a result in the reduction of its national territory. It is recommended that the Czech-Slovak agreement on the division of military assets of the former Czechoslovakia be studied (18).

Successful negotiations may release sufficient military assets to equip the CDF without resort to costly equipment programmes. However, Catalonia should only take such assets that fit into its military requirements.



The possible retention by Spain of some bases in Catalonia, to protect its national defence interests, should be considered. The agreed presence of foreign forces does not undermine national sovereignty. Such arrangements can be to the mutual benefit of both countries (19).

A militarily weak Catalonia would create a vulnerable flank in Spain's national defence. Defence cooperation between Spain and Catalonia is in the interests of both countries.

## **X. CONCLUSION**

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To provide a credible deterrent Catalonia has to have proportionally comparable forces to its neighbours.

An independent Catalonia will be required to contribute significantly to international peace and stability.

Catalonia has a strong and vibrant economy, and has the capacity and resources to provide for its security and defence.

In the final analysis, there is no point in having an Independent Catalonia, unless the will is there to defend it.



## Notes and References

- (1) UN Charter, Chapter V11, Art 43.1 *making armed forces available to the UN*
- (2) Treaty of the EU. *TEU art 24*. Also, *Lisbon Treaty*
- (3) Washington Treaty, *NATO Article 5*
- (4) In military history terms, modern war is dated from the US Civil War (1861-65)
- (5) A warship may be operational for 35-40 years, artillery ammunition 25-30 years
- (6) "*Weissbuch Sicherheitspolitik und zur Zukunft*" published by the German Defence Ministry July 2016
- (7) WMDs usually refers to nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.
- (8) Banks, ministries and media outlets were hit. Russia suspected but never proven
- (9) Range of EU Rapid Reaction Force is 3,500-4,000km.
- (10) Sweden and Switzerland
- (11) Another option is to modify "*defend*" and state the role instead as "*determined resistance to external aggression on land, sea and in the air*". See "*Reflections on the Defence of an Independent Scotland*", Page 7, paragraph National Defence, by Lee. Published by the IIEA (Institute of International and European Affairs), in Aug 2013.
- (12) Peace Support Operations include peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations.
- (13) SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) figures for 2015
- (14) '*A' the Blue Bonnets* by Crawford and Marsh, published by RUSI, in July 2012
- (15) "*The Military Balance*" 2014 published by IISS (International Institute for Strategic Studies)
- (16) Irish military representative associations have input to conditions of service matters, but no say in operational matters. No right to strike, but can access the Minister and the media. See also PDFORRA, RACO and RDFRA.
- (17) This Belgian/Netherlands agreement comes into effect in the summer of 2017.
- (18) The separation took effect on 1 January 1993. Military equipment was divided 2: 1 in favour of the Czech Republic, based on pro rata of population.
- (19) A wide variety of options are possible, ranging from simple agreement on location of foreign forces on Catalan soil, to long term leasing arrangements, such as the UK's Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus to (Dhekelia, and Akrotiri/Episkopi)